Before, Behind, and evry where, Faith is, Or sees, the very Masterpiece of Bliss. All Its Materials are a Living Tomb Of Glory, striking the Spectator dumb And there our GOD is seen in Perspective
As if he were a BODY and alive.
-Thomas Traherne "Article" in Com.mentaries of Heaven T11E CHANCE AaPPEARANCE. in a London bookstall of Thomnas Traherne's manuscripts of poems and meditations' early in the twentieth century coincided with Modernist interests in seventeenth-century poetry.' This coincidence naturally included Traherne in Modernist studies of lyric poetry. Modernist ahistoricism, however, relegated Traherne to a secondary place among already established poets such1 as Donne, Herbert, and Marvell: his work did not conform to standards that established poetry as "classic," such as compressed metaphors, double entendres, "telescoping itnages," and formal unity. In his essay "Mystic and Politician as Poet" (Listener 3 [19301: 590-91 ), 1. S.Ehot exercises his Modemist detachment from cultural context, deeming Traherne "more a mystic than a poet,' 3 a writer attentive to contemporary religious and political ideo]ogy at the cost of language and form. TI hus, Lliot dismisses TIraherne from the pantheon of wvorthy poets. Ironically, while modernist requirements for inclusion into the carnon eschew historical and cultural circumstance, the cultural circumstance of Traherne's discovery is the very criterion that placed him Traheme's language and ars poetica remain among the most maligned among anthologized seventeenth-century poets A fur-ther irony encompasses the critical judgmients expended upon TErahernie's oeuvre. Whllle Modern-ists found his work too imibedded in culture, attempts to place it specifically within that culture have proven difficult indeed. Comparatively little is known ahout situationLs s v,ihich 3:raheme wrote his poems and prose meditations, or about Traherne's life. Trahemne s biographers have largely based their accounts upon readings of his poetry and prose, which seem ecstatic anrd childlike. Placing Traherne's spiritual autobiography into biographical lacunae is one method of organizing the scant information that we have ahout him: he was born in Herefordshire in 1637, a shoemaker's son; attended Brasenose College. O)xford, at 15, earning his B.A. at 18; was ordained in 1_657 as a Puritan minister to the rectorship of the parish of Credenhill, near Hereford; earned his Oxford M.A. in 1661; Dbecame one of the conformin.g clergy in 1660. served as the Anglican chaplain to Charles II's I ord Keeper of the Seal, OrLando Bridgemnan by 1667 cdied in 1672 at 1Bridge-man's house in Ieddington. Yet, evein these few biographical facts suggest that Traherne did not withdraw to the world of naive ecstasy that his biographers find in his spiritual autobiography, but that he engaged in the intellectual and political life of the period. A literal reading of the "I" in Traherne's poems and meditation-s creates a tautology: critics build a fiction of Traherne's life out of the fiction of his work in order to clarify the known. facts about his life, which in turn will clarify his work. Ilis biographer anci editor Cladys Wade codifies this identification of cause and effect when she concludes in 1942 that 'Iraherne is "one of the zmost radianitly, most infectiously happy mortals this earth has known.`"S Recent articles have attemptetd to rescuie Trahemie fronm the legacy of his early biographers, placing hiul in a political context. Both N. I.
Matur and Julia 3. Smith connect Traherne to political events during his lifetnime, ancd the recent discovery of lTraheme's long political poem sanctions such a reading.: A political reading of Traheme however, renmains somewhat problematic, since Traheme was in the employ of both Puritani and Anglican factioms at different stages of his career. Because of these contraiy loyalties, Smith deems lIraherne a political "conformist," one who wants to fit in and keep those around himl} happy, a position not so far removed from Wade's diagnosis of a happy mnan. The benign view of a cheerful Traherne, then, remains largely unchallenged eveni now.
The obstacle to critical judgment created by the nmixture of Traherne's late discovery and his biographers' over-determined reading of his work remains easier to diagnose than to cure. Iraherne's radical experimentation with language, coupled with our lack of informnatioin about his life, presents a reading problem of greater complexity than almost any other in seventeenth-century studies. Each issue, the hnguistic and the cultural, seeMs lo require an individual methodology; one, a study of his language apart from Mo-dermist assumptions, and the other, placement of Traherne's work within a cultural context greater than those offered by theological debate or political strugge. Yet, while these two critical problems are distinct, they also are inextricably linked: language from Traheme's culture organizes that of his poetry. One cannot be addressed without also addressing the other. To consider language and the linguistic culture it forms requires taking the kind of middle ground between fields of study common for a student such as Traheme in the mid-seventeenth century. Traheme received the standard Oxford education, studying "Logic, Ethics, Physics, Metaphysics, Geometry, Astronomy, Poesy, Medicine, Grammar, Music, Rhetoric, . . Arts, Trades and Mechanisms." 8 As fluent in these subjects as poets such as Donne and hlerbert, Traheme's use of the language from these subjects nonetheless has seemed to many readers at best subdued or even absent. Yet I believe that his awareness of the history and development of "poesy" and the fine arts grounds Traherne as deeply in the theoretical issues of his art as he is grounded in Biblical exegesis and theology. Rather than writing a non-poetic verse in wvhich he elaborates a personal ecstatic -vision. Trahemne attempts to write poetry that synthesizes poetic theory and painting theory. This synthesis, I argue, accounts for his abstract and non-metaphorical language, language that has seemed more like prose than poetry t o his readers. His quest to strike a new kind of language from issues resonant in poetics and painting forms the extraordinary theoretical substructure of his work.
Uncovering that theoretical substructure is imy task in this essay. I argue that Traheme engages poetics and painting at atypical theoretical angles. He addresses specifically the evolution and general use of metaphor in the tradition of Petrarch and the English anti-Petrarchan tradition, while also interrogating the technologies of three-dimensional perspective and the clearreflecting mirror that dominate Renaissance painting. Examining both the Petrarchan construction of metaphor and Renaissance theories of linear perspective allows Traherne to engage in a discussion with a particular ideological issue that both share, the issue of subjectivity. This exchange with poetics and painting results in Traherne's forging a unique poetic language, one predicated upon the non-representational metaphor, 9 and one that attempts to devise a poetic middle ground between subjective and objective representation that maintains what be sees as desirable qualities in each. Such a conversation shows that Traherne's obsession with vision is that of an intellectual visionary who attempts to reclaim poetry from its central role in a cultural narrative that mistakes subjectivity for objectivity. Despite his strong efforts, however, Traherne's poetry represents a failed engagement with cultural hegemony. Ultimately, Traherne cannot redirect the powerful ideological trajectory that would take western thought to the subjective idealismn of Berkeley and Fichte and the subjiectivism of Kant.
Snapshots of the Petrarchlani Past
Traherne claims ovnership of a ntew kind of language in the preface of his Poemns of Felicy " one that spL-rns the poer's aost useful tools, the metaphor and the irnage. have put forward various hypotheses to explain the longevity and intensity of letrarchan antI anti-Petrarchan rhetoric-poltncs, gender issues, and so forth' I-btui at its core, anti-Petrarchan poetry vilities t:he Petrarchan use of elaborate nmetaphor, and we mitust place Traheme's claim within this important context. The guileless hvperbole of poetry typical of til end of the Petrarchan era in the English Renaissance validates the poet's inmpulse to attack such poetr-y. Stock versions of late anti-Petrarcha'n poetry focus ulpon poetry written in the mannen-but not with the style or dexterity-of Petrarch. iE1 the hands of a Petrarch ranqlit, tlhe s rtling m inetaphors that h:ae used to introduice the sonnet form beconie comic in their over-ripeness.5 NI-Much of this Late Petrarehan poetry is simply outrageous in its use of metaphor, and mnerits -taherne's descnption of its "curling Metaphors that gild the Sence." But anti-Petrarchan poets, too, are capable of making outrageous claims about what they will not do with metaphor. In one of the more famous of these claims, Shakespeare's speaker asserts, "My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun-" (Sonnet 130). While Shakespeare indicates here that he finds Petrarch-an metaphor absurd in its hyperbole, his closing lines-that he loves his mistress more than those who write hyperbole love their rnistresses-may in fact be the most hyperbolic claim of all. In a move typical of anti-Petrarchan poets, Shakespeare uses metaphor to spurn nietaphor Anti-Petrarclhism uses metaphor to make a kind of understated overstatement. Yet poets clainiing to simplify metaphor and structure do so with a wink and a nod; after all, if poets were to take anti-Petrarchism literally, they would deprive themselves of the variety available to them writhin complex metaphor and stLucture, and thus make writing poetry almost impossible.
The figurative strategy of anti-Petrarchism argues for metaphor with less distance betWeen the subject of comparison and its analogy. Alonig the continuum of anti-Petrarchan contention, the extremity of Traherne's position is almost matched by George l-erbert's in his two "Jordan" poems (The Works of George Herbert, ed., F-.E. flutchinson [Oxford, 1941] ). Each of Herbert's poems exists vestigially in Traherne's poetry: lHerbert's well-kniown phrase in "Jordan (1I)"-"Curling in metaphors a plain intention"-yields Traherne's "no curling metaphors that gild the sense;, in "Jordan (I)," Herbert's argument about poetic styles, rather than his language, p-refigures Trraheme's position. Traherne's use of Herbert in this instance, however, illustrates Harold Bloom's "miap of misreading," a misreading understandable when we examine Ilerbert's rhetoric in "Jordan (l)`' OCne of the few poets whom Traheme quotes in his notebooks.'(,' erbert adopts in "Jordan (I)" a strategy of arguing for "truth," a condition that places the word as close to its referent as possible. He opens this first of his two famous ars poetica with an anti-Petrarchan claim that seenms very close to Traherme's: "Who says that fictions only and false hair! become a verse? Is there in truth no beauty? / .... Must purling streams refresh a lover's loves?" ("Jordan I," lines 1-2, 8). tUnlike Traheme's bald statements, however, I lerbert asks rhetorical questions that imply his disgust with the tired aggrandizeiient of Petrarchan love poems: "Who says that exaggeration is the only way to praise?" and "Is there nothing beautiful in truth?" While it is always dangeTous to ask genuine questions in poetry since the reader may supply the wrong answer, Hierbert is the consistent master of this locution. lie entices us to say to ourselves, "of course the simnple truth is the most beautiful." I ere, 1 lerbert. seemns to dismiss the overwrought Petrarchan discourse; by the end of "Jordan (1)," however, he also dismisses t'he logical alternative to that discourse, the plain Puritan style of writing. When we try to make sense of these Carol A,nnjohnstont opposing claims in "Jordan (S),' we see that Herbert actually has retained rather than purged the Petrarchan "windcing stair," and exaggerated metaphor even while he claims to purgTe it. W\e mrust go around the block to cross the street in the poem, unwinding all the rhetoric to discover that lierbert does not want to be forced to use Puritan poetics (language exclusive to praising God, as he describes it) to write poetry, LIke Shakespeare, lherbert only seenis to reject Petrarchisnm, while retaining th-e essence of its strategy.
Given the complexity of Herbert's rhetorical scheme in "Jordani (E," it seems possible that Traherne takes Herbert at his word, at least his word at the outset of the poem, and builds upon his anti-Petrarchan claim-i in his work. Or perhaps Traheme understands the seeming contradiction in the poem-I-lerbert's rhetorical rejection both of Petrarchan and of Puritan styles-as an attenmpt to compromise, or to develop a new kind of poetry. Either way, Traheme's reading of Herbert yields a pledge that neither Hlerbert, nor any representative anti-Petrarchan poet, has made. While Herbert initially argues for the plain truth to bring subject and object close together, and while Shakespeare claims to compare his mistress' eyes not to the faraway sun, but to themselves, Traherne argues bor metaphor with literally no distance between subject and comparison. "Things' simnply appear in his poems, he argues, in non-referential language. Although each poet's assertions about his use of metaphor are somewhat inaccurate, nonetheless the underlying claimis are perspicacious in their recognition of the problems inherent in Petrarchan metaphor. Traheme pushes these claims to an extremse.
Petrarch, Thomas Greene explains, took metaphor in a direction radically different from its use in Classical and Medieval poetry, initiating a new way of reading (and writing) poetry in the early modern period, which Greene calls "the activity of subreading.' Petrarch's method in effect invents a poetry that is about bridging space and time, rather than adhering to hermeneutic methods.7 Petrarch's new method concerns the poet's emphasis upon his subject position. Greene explains:
The older [rmedieval her'meneutic] method presupposed a fullness of knoYwledge awaiting the successful interpreter-knowledge that is whole and entire because it can be unlocked by a single operation of the appropriate intellectual key. This method aligned author and reader in a single universe of discourse wherein no cultural distance could exist because, with the sole exception of the Christian revelation, histofical change was virtually unknlown. The new "archeological" hermeneutic, on the other hand, presupposed a considerable distance and withheld a single all-divulging key. Instead of a relation betveen "veil" and 'Truth' that, once discovered, is easily grasped and formulated, there emerges an interplay of entities that resists total description because it operates in the elusive domain of style. Style by definition cannot be described perfectly even if it can be categorized. And the poetic substance enmeshed in, or half-buried beneath, the verbal surface is now perceived as teaching the reader from far off, from a remote and prestigious world radically unlike his own.
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Greene's breakthrough here is two-fold: Unlike Medieval writers who wrote to add to texts and prevailing truths, and lacked a causal understanding of history, Petrarch discovers history and in so doing, also establishes a kind of subjectivity. Once Petrarch discovers the "ancient" aspect of historical texts, then he begins a process of imitating, rather than of adding to these texts. The subtle difference between imitation and addition gives us a Petrarchan text that is layered, rather than linear, in its use of influence. T-hus the surface-the "style" of the Petrarchan text-emphasizes the individual writer, while the text taken as a whole alludes to an ancient precursor as it also highlights the individual imitator of that precursor. The nature of writing, according to Petrarch, is imitation, not addition: 'A proper imitator should take care that what he writes resemble the original without reproducing it." 1 9 Through this process of imitation, Petrarch self-consciously distances himnself from the historical text, and thus establishes a unique concept of subject and object position. 20 The writer imnitating an ancient text buries that text as an object beneath his own subjective style. Reading Petrarch requires that the reader identify Petrarch's subjectivity, through his style, as well as the existence of an historical object, the ancient text, beneath that style. In clarifying Petrarch's achievements, Greene advances our understanding of Traherne, though he does not consider him directly. The contrast that Greene points out between subjective style in Petrarch's text and the objectivity of the texts that Petrarch imitates (objectivity still available to readers if they "sub-read" l'etrarch's text) carries implications for all aspects of reading postPetrarchan texts, most profoundly for the conception and use of metaphor. The essence of metaphor is comparison, and the more a comparison is infused with the writer's subjectivity, the greater the distance between the objects compared, as well as between the reader and the writer, both in experience and imagination. Before Petrarch, metaphors were not personal; after Petrarch, the only way to read poetry with precision and certainty is to be the poet. All other readers are disjoined from the writer's individual experience. Traherne, more than any other anti-Petrarchan poet, reacts against the polarities inherent in Petrarchan subjectivity; in fact, he tries to move poetry back to a prePetrarchan innocence.
For pre-Romantic writers, subjectivity holds a dual identity. Placement of the individual vis-&-vis the object of his writing (or for the reader, placement vis-&-vis both the writer and the object of the writing) remains primary. After
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Romanticism, this aspect of subjectivity collapses in-to its secondary identity, that of personal emotions and feelings, so for modern readers, subjectivity indicates primarily the feelinigs of the writer about the material he addresses. For pre-Romanitics, however, feelings were not. necessarily thouglht to be "sincere;" rather, emotions simply addedl an intriguing and witty texture to the work. As he attempts to return the subjective to a state closer to objectivity, Traherne remains the pre-Romantic and concentrates on the placement of the writer and reader in relationship to the object of fLocus.
The Subject of Linear Perspective Is Subjectivity
In his attempt to reform the subjectivity he finds in Petrarchan metaphor. Trahene replaces the rhetoric of anti-Petrarchism that he alludes to in the introduction to his Poems of Felitity withl the linguistic network of linsear perspective and its subset, the trope of the mirror. Despite the striking anti-Petrarchan lainguage of the preface, the Poems of Felicity do not themselves employ this language. The preface poemn seems, rather, to be the strategy with which Traherne introduces us to his primary concern, but due to the excessive baggage of anti-Petrarchan poetry, he moves to another language and another strategy not only within this unfinished manuscript, but also within all of his work. Traherne's subject-the issue of subjective placernent-domninates the conversation concemiiig the development of linear perspective in fifteenth-century Italy, while it is only one of a complement of issues that Petrarchan language engages. PerspeetIval language thus brings to poetry fewer complications and associations than the Petrarchan. In all of hlis work, Tralherne shapes perspectival language into the arena in whiich he engages with the troubling issues that he finds inherent both in subjiective post-Petrarchan metaphor, anid the subjective language describing linear perspective.
The invention of 'linear' or "single-point" perspective in fifteenth-century Florence narrowed the way that viewers looked at painting; a series of mathematically placed orthogonal lines gives the illusion that the painting recedces into a single "vanishing poinit," thereby offering only one spot, the centrist point, fromn which an individual viewer may see the painting in perfect threedimensional perspective. Perspective, in its simplest terms, is about the relationship of' one object to another in space. Once vision becomes concentrated upon the relationship among olbjects, as perspective forces it to do, the emphasis falls upon the inidividual viewer who sees and organizes those relationships. '['he individual visual subject, when viewing a scene in perspective, can and must mnove around, to fined the correct viewing position, the centrist point. By emphasizing the relationship between objects and this mnovement of the viewing subject searching for the "correct" view, perspectival painting lays bare the question of subjective placement. '['his subjective orientation is a prodcuct of specific cultural forces. In The Conquest of Ameica (trans., Richard I-loward [New York: liarper Perennial. 1992] ), Tzvetan Todorov points out how linear perspective informs the cultural narrative of subjectivity. Discussing the difference between European perspective and that of Aztec sculpture, he writes:
The Aztec sculptures are worked on all sides, includinig the base, even if they weigh several tons; this is because the object's observer is as little individual as its executant; representation gives us essence and is not concerned with the impressions of any one man. European linear perspective may not have originated from the concern to validate a single and individual viewpoint, but it becomes its symbol. adding itself to the individuality of the objects represented. It may seem bold to link the introduction of perspective to the discovery and conquest of Amiierica, yet the relation is there, not because Toscanelli, inspirer of Columbrus, was the friend of Bruneileschi and Alberti, pioneers of perspective (or because Piero della Francesca, another founder of perspective, died on October 12, 1492), but by reason of the transformation that both facts simultaneously reveal and produce in human consciousness. 1 The invention of linear perspective stresses the shift from the seeming invisible objectivity of both artist and viewer, Todorov reminds us that the origin of perspective 'validate[s] a single and individual viewpoint," and as such informs the cultural narrative that equates subjectivity with objectivity. Like linear perspective, as I have discussed, Petrarchism also authorizes such singularity of vision, and as such both Petrarchism and perspective engage in a discourse concerming subjectivity.
Iike Petrarchism and perspective in painting, the clear glass mirror also is a part of the cultural narrative of subjectivity. The language of the rmirror is a subset of perspectival language, because mirrors are intimately linked to the development of linear perspective. In his theoretical treatise On Painting (1435-36), the Florentine humanist Leon Battista Alberti notes the use of the accurate glass mirror to show defects in a painting: "A mirror will be an excellent guide [to judging relief-effect]. I do not know how it is that paintings that are without fault look beautiful in a mirror; and it is remnarkable how every defect in a picture appears more unsightly in a mirror. So the things that are taken from Nature should be emended with the advice of the mirror.""' Thle invention of accurate glass mirrors, notably this ability of the mirror to expose faults in relief, enabled Alberti and his contemporary Brunelleschi in their invention of linear perspective. 23 Brunelleschi's 1425 vignette of the Baptistery of Florence, though now lost, is recognized as the work generating linear perspective. On this panel, Brunelleschi painted a view of the baptistery from a representation that he had traced on and over its mirror reflection, After determining the centric ray and the vanishinig point, Brunelleschi drilled a hole in his panel at that exact spot.
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'T'he viewer was to peer through the hole frorn the backside of the panel into a rnim-ror, which reversed the inmage again, reflecting the view in the correct direction. The viewer could slide the tmirror, which reflected tie real sky, with mnoving clouds, to change the scale.2< in effect, thie mnirror proved that the artist's renderiuig of scale and proportion was accurate. 2 " By establishing the accuracy oif scale and proportion, the mnirror seemied to prove that a painting in linear perspective was also "trite" and real. This imnportant slippage from "accurate" to "trute" could lead the individual viewer to assunme that the painter had captured general-oobjective-experiernce, rather than subjectively reconstiructed an imitation of such experience. Such a slippage could lead the viewer to imagine and even. assumne that his point of view when observing the painting could be objective. But in fact, the accuracy of perspectival paintings is available only to one person at anly g,iven time (hence, its importance to notions of the individual as a coherent and unified entity), since there is o nly a single viewing spot, cdesignated by the individual painter, that reveals the correct scale and proportion of the painting. Assuming the objectivity of the experience -when viewing a perspectival painting effectively miasks the subjectivity intrinsic to the construction of in1ear perspective. Until the seventeenth century, English artists and patrons could experience the illusion of perspectival painting only by travelling to the Continent or seeing the few perspectival paintings imported to England from the Continent. Likewise, the English did not begin to mass-produce glass mirrors until the beginning of the seventeenlth centurv, well after their widespread use in Italy,S7 Both Nicholas I lilliard, the English miniaturist, and poet Philip Sidney traveled. to the Continent, but each caine away with different ideas about perspectival reproduction. H ilhard eschews precise, mzathematical perspectival painting in his treatise (ca. 1600), The Arte oj i.rning (Great Britain: Mid Northuinberlanid Arts Group in association with Carcanet New Press, 1981).28 lie argues that perspective is actually an "effect or judgment of the eye" which has the purpose of "deceiv[ingl both the understanding and the eye" (71).2' As I lilliard understan ds it. perspectival painting is misleadingly "real," offering a restrictive though seductive view of the natural world that takes the viewer away from experiencing nature objectively. I lliard's dismissal of perspective raises issues parallel to the Puritan Stephen Gossen's attack on poetry in School of Abtuse as "the mTother of lies' that represents a copy of nature falsely as the truth. In response to this argument. Philip Sidney writes, famnously, "Nature never set forth the eartlh in so rich tapest-ry as divers lsicl poets have done; neither wvith so pleasant rivers, fruitful trees, sweet-smzelling flowers, nor wnatsoever else may make the too nmuch loved earth miore lovely. I ler world is brazen, the poets only deliver a golden." Sidney argues here that the poet does Thomas Traheme's Yearning Subject not conform to a mimesis or copy of nature as the Puritan polemicist would have it, but rather adheres to a mimesis of nature's internal virtues, to which he had access because of his own internal virtues. Nature's visible world is flawed, compared with its internal perfection. While Sidney attempts to argue for virtue within the self that gives the self contact with the objective virtues, this conception remains a sticking point in discussions such as Hilliard's about representation.31 Unlike Sidney's rebuttal of Gossen that emphasizes the subject's ability to transmit objective virtues, Hilliard's treatise argues the opposite. He determines that by employing the technique of linear perspective to construct subjectivity, his art (painting) would "deceive" and mislead the viewer because the subjective point of view could only seem objective, and not actually be objective, as Sidney contends. Hilliard, Sidney, and Gossen's arguments anticipate the problematic issues of subjectivity inlherent both in Petrarchan poetry and in perspectival painting. In spite of objections and holdouts by esteemed English painters such as Ililliard, perspective becomes the mode of painting in seventeenth-century England, enough so that Traherne's technical knowledge of the method matches his understanding of the argument about subjectivity that lies beneath the practice.
Perspective in Traherne
Compared to anti-Petrarchan rhetoric, perspectival language offers Iraherne the relative isolation of his subject of subjectivity. Anti-Petrarchan rhetoric, as I have discussed, does not erase Petrarchan subjectivity; rather by ernploying the subjectivity of Petrarchan language in a more subtle form. antiPetrarchan rhetoric heightens the importance of the individual. in order to attempt his project of moving poetic language to its seeming pre-Petrarchan objectivity, Traherne must move away from anti-Petrarchan language. Perspectival language provides Traherne with a cache of unique linguistic visual cues with whisch to make his claims about objectivity. Paradoxically, though the linguistic network of perspective is visual, it does not offer pictorial evidence for a poet to imitate in language in the manner of metaphoric writing; rather, it provides visual references that are not strictly imagistic in the senLse that the metaphor itself is usually thought of as being imagistic. The language of linear perspective concerns the way that a painter establishes object relationships, not the specific objects themselves, and the mirror, of course, is merely reflective. Symbolically, there is no there, there. In using these two perspectival stores of language, 'Traherne must write about how they work and what they accomplish, rather than representing them imagistically as something only viewable by an individual subject. Thus with perspectival language TFraherne may isolate subjectivity in order to attempt to erase, or at least reform, subjective assumptions.
Having noted that the subject of' perspective is subjectivity, I seenm to be arguing against nmyself when I say that perspectival language enables 'Traherne's claims about objectivity. The perspectival and mirroriing networks do in one sense exhibit in their perfonrance the subjectivity that is their subject: a poet can use perspectival language to describe the actions and resluIts generated by his particular--su-:Dbjective-poiint of view. Ilowever, because perspectival language removes the need to depict actions metaphorically or imagistically, techniques that revert to subjectivity, the poet can over-ballast his subjective position with non-metaphoric language that can functionl objectively. However, while perspective and the mirror each have no visual antecedent. unlike individual sub3ective points of xview, they are not indetermrinate; their function is always umiform and technical. In this sense, both perspectival and mirroring categories are objective. By using the language of these networks, Traherne attempts to naintain a patina of the complexity andl materiality of Petrarchan subjectivity, whille he also strives to give his text the objectivity, stabDility, and inclusivity lost when sulhjectivity is constructed by the text. In a sense, then, Traherne agrees with Sidneys contentions, that a poet can show an objective-golden and prelapsarian-world. Yet, in order to achieve Sidney's purpose, 'Traherne negates Sidney's Petrarchan and antiPetrarchan metaphors with his claimis and with his language,
The followin-g passage of poetry from Conimentarics of Heaven offers an overview of Traherne's use of the perspectival network, showing not only the language of perspective at the center of tlhe passage (which I underscore) but also Traheme's attempt to use the network to locate his poetry away from the subjectivity of the single viewer antd of Petrarchan metaphor, and toward the objectivity that seerms to disappear with Petrarchan emphasis on the individual. But ("'Article," lines 3 5-36)32
As with his claims about metaphor. Traherne's concern here is with division of subject and object, in which subjective vision stands in for objectivity Making an assertion parallel to that about metaphor, Traherne nevertheless shifts from, anti-Petrarchan language-"no curling metaphors to gild the sense"-to the language of linear perspective. Rather than description or metaphor, Iraherne gives us the abstract language of the activity of seeing: "relation," "proportion," "symmetry," ' justify," "viewing eye." Unless vision organizes objects in the unified whole, "many parts in their full unity," then vision is "broken." and consequently, so is the soul and life. Faithless human vision, Traherne argues, is subjective and "broken," yet perniciously, and as with perspectival painting, that subjectivity can seem objective. Traherne places God as a viewer of the universe who can choose to see from an infinite number of positions, similiar to Thdorov's viewers of Aztec sculpture, moving around the object. Yet, while this kind of non-perspectival seeing does not mistake the objective for the subjective, it remains "broken," with no sense of unity. To see "all," however, the viewer must be where he can see in "Relation and Proportion," in other words, in the perspectival "centrist" position. Remarkably, Traheme's God both moves beyond the piecemeal vision of pre-perspectival vision and beyond the subjectivity of linear perspective as well: "The Parts do justify each other, to / The Ey of him, that all at once doth view." 1raheme's God has the best of both kinds of seeing, a synchronicity of the partial vision of perspectival vision, with the intimacy and seeming objectivity of pre-perspectival vision. This combination of methods of seeing gives God perfect vision, seeing a "united Fabrick when intire," as well as a universe "Searchd from the Bottom to the Top throughout / With in, in all its Intregues, round about, / Before, Behind, and evry where."
Yet, Traherne does not leave us with a God that has perfect vision and a faithless human constituency who can see only bits and pieces. "Faith" is the vehicle by which individuals achieve this impossible combination of viewing positions, simultaneously allowing the viewer to see from the centrist position (symmetry and proportion) and from all possible angles (the whole). The faithful Christian gets the ultimate reward in Traherne's universe: with his newly-constructed vision, he sees God and is struck "dunmb" when "GOD is seen in Perspective / As if he were a BODY and alive." TFraherne insists that faith in an objectve God overcornes the limitations of human visiOn-; faith reforms the subjectivity of linear perspective by giving Christians perspectival views of God from a truly objective point of view.
Traherne also voices the perspectival relationship with God through his 'every C.hristian" speaker in the third meditation fromi his CenturXies of Meditanion. lere the speaker finds himself in the wrong viewing position, and expands upon this condition to draw out. the comparison between perspective and faith. like the speaker of the lyrics, the speaker in v he Centturies compares his misguided spiritual condition to one of spatial imbalance and disorder. He himself is a piece "out of framne, otit of proportion, which he must place back into proper perspective. lie must occupy the place of central perspective and simultaneously must sit on the throne with God, in order to enjoy the spectacle both of God and h1is creation from the proper vantage point, where "all things larel well in their proper pLaces." 'lhis spectacle once seen., will never be forgotten. It is a Great part of the Beatifick Vision. A Sig-ht of 1lappiness is H-iappiness. It transforms the Soul anid makes it Heavenly, it powerfully calls us to Comnmunion with God, and weanLs us from the Custroms of this World[] It puts a lustre upon GOD and all I hs Creatures and makes us to see them in a Divine and Eternal Light. I no sooner discertned this hut I was (as Plato saith, In surnintl Rationis Arce Quies habitat) seated in a Throne of repose anti perfect rest. All things were well in their Proper Places, I alone was out of frame and had need to he Mended. For all things were Gods treasures in their proper places, and I was to be restored to Gods Imnage. Whereupon you will not believ, how I was withdrawn from all Endeavors of altering and Mernling Outward Things. They lay so well methouights, they could not be mrended: but I must be Mended to Enjoy them. (C 3. 60) As in the previous passage, there are few specific objects here-the speaker sees only "things' for example-hut while this passage is barren of description and of concrete arid compresscd inages (Eliot's "telescoping" images), the network of perspectival language again functions as a substructure shaping and flrmializing the speaker's relatiunship to God. Also consistenit with the previous passage is Frairerne's stress upon the simultaneity of viewing positions that faith allows, as an} antidote to subjectivity, the speaker envisions himselfl as occupying the perfect viewing position on the throne with God, as well as remaining on earth, 'mended" and enjoying the physical world in its proper perspective. Unlike the previous passage, this one is quite explicit here in its reference to Traherne's theory of metaphor. "A Sight of Happiness is I-lappiness," he writes, insisting as he does in his "Author to the Critical Peru,ser" that the faithful Christian will find no linguistic barriers of false subjectivity. Hiere, the language is visual, consistent with the perspeetival structure of the passage, Carol AnnJohnston 390 Thomas Traherne's Yearning Subject 391. yet, he insists upon calling attention to his non-mietaphorical use of visual language: happiness is happiness, it is not 'like` any object whatsoever. Further, he attempts within this framework to objectify experience. Happiness here is not an individual state; rather it is something objective, for all to see and simultaneously to absorb. What may seem tauto]ogical-happiness being happiness-epitomizes Traherne's use of perspectival language: to attempt to move from the subjective and to the objective.
In these two passages showing Traherne's use of linear perspective, we see also his understanding of the limitations that the centrist viewing position imposes on viewers. The isolation of the self offers a destablizingly singular and fragmented view of the world, a view that Traherne associates with the individual who must be "mended" within through faith in God. Once faithful, the individual can then envision from God's point of view and, simultaneously, envision God. Not limited by the rules of linear perspective, this view also offers a picture of the world with the best characteristics of a perspectival painting, as if the vision were "reall."
"At Once the Mirror and the Object Be" While Traherne employs three-dimensional perspective in the passages above in his attemnpt to remove the flaws inhereint in subjective representation, he suggests only in the vague phrase "beatifick Vision" how faith allows the believer to experience this refomrned vision, or where he may see "our GOD ... In Perspective / As if he were a B3ODY and alive." At this juncture, Traherne's transition from the visual may seem simply mystical, sornething only available in familiar non-material "visions," Certainly, this aspect of his attempt to create a non-visual visual language represents the most fraught and most demanding articulation of Traherne's project. To solve the puzzle of how one reaches this situation, he draws on the trope of the mirror. As with linear perspective, viewers of a reflection in a mirror can believe that they see something real, and as with viewers of perspectival painting, their experience is singular, particularly when viewing their own reflections. No individual can see another's reflection from the samne point of view; this is an impossibly subjective experience. in the case of this clear mirror, as with the linear perspective that it enabled, one of the important results of technological development, then, is an emphasis upon subjectivity, rather than upon the objectivity that it comes to represent. In addition to its fundamental use in perspectival painting, the-mirror may seem an especially fitting source for Traherne, for it has a long pedigree as an image for the Christian soul, rooted in the well-known passage from the book of Corintllians: "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known" (i Corinthians 12:13). 37 The imnage of the soul as a mirror of eternity is well developed in patristic literature, most notably in Augaustine. 3 4 Indeed, readers associating iraherne'5 work with theological treatises have assumied that when 'raherne writes of the soul as "'The Mirror of an endless Life" ("Fiulness," line 5), he miierely reiterates early Christian writers. I argue, however, that while Traherne certainly draws uponI previous uses of the mirror trope in Christian texts, he departs from traditional uses of this trope at critical points. Both the technical development: of the mirror and its use to confirm drawings to scale require these depart-ures.
In significant ways, 'Traherne's mirror trope remains congXruous witlh early Christian definitions. For example, 'raherne defines the reflections in the mirroring soul very strictly they are "Ideas from the Skie." God is in the sky, and ideas emanate from him. 'This patristic formulation had its beginnings in classical philosophy. I'lato ar,ues that ideas represent objective standards, outlining what is real mnore accurately than does the physical world. Drawing upon Platonic thought, Augustine argues that ideas are actually God's objective pattern and as such exist inL God's mind. These ideas appear in the mirror of thie soul." In the first stanza of "The Circulation,"' Traherne both articulates the attributes of the soul as a mimrorT and sets out the identity of the reflections in that mirroring soul: ("'Ihe Circulation," lines 1-14)
The first two lines balance "fair Ideas" and '"images of T hings" on either side of the equation, both "Ideas" and "Images of Things" maya "Unto a Spotless Mirror flie." Further, both, when they "lodge" in the miirror, "affect the Sence." "Images of Tliiings," it seems, would naturally affect the sense of sight, but it is less clear what "Sence" the "Ideas" affect, unless we take into account the histoIy of thie soul represented as a mirror, with ideas as objects reflected in the soul. The "Sence" that "Ideas" affect is the reflective "Sence" of the soul. > Building upon Neo-platonic conceptions of the sou1l, Descartes explains Caroi AnnJohnston 39.' 2 this "sence" of the soul in his Opticks: "We kniow for certain it is the soul which has sensory perceptions, and not the body" (Rene Descartes, Discourse on Mlethod, Optics, Geomeuy, and Meteorology, trans., Paul J. Olscamp [Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965] , 164). " Descartes bases this conception upon the Platonic notion that ideas are more real than "things: Descartes' "soul" has a substance that. is mnore "real' than the body. Traheme expresses a Neo-platonic view similar to Descartes' formulation, giving the soul substance and sensoiy perceptions. Hlis analogy of the soul with the physical body offers the soul by association physical (mechanical) attributes:
[God] Can make the soul by Sense to feel and see, And with her.Joy the Senses wrap'd to be. Yea while the Flesh of Body subject lies To those Affections which in Souls arise; All holy Glories from the Soul redound, And in the Body by the Soul abound, Are felt within, and ravish ev'ry Sense, With all the Godhead's glorious Excellence Who found the way himself to dwell within, As if even Flesh were nigh to him of kin.
("Thanksgivings for the Body II," lines 21-30)
T:his particular "Thanksgiving,' though it is dedicated to the body, saves its mnost eloquent praise for the soul, wIlch takes on body-like senses when the divine is present: "[Godl Can make the soul by Sense to feel and see." Traherne here works from the commoniplace that man is created in the image of God. Ile stretches this comimonplace by placing God's inage within man, then stretches it again even further; God's image in the soul has a particular form. T he inages in the soul, we recall, are ideas, or as Traherne designates them, "thoughts:"
Thoughts are a kind of Strange Celestial Creature, That when they're Good, they're such in evry Feature, T hey bear the Timage of their father's face, And Beautifie even all his Dwelling Place: ("Thoughts. ' Ml., lines [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] Each good "thought` is a "creature" bearing the image of God. Traheme emphasizes that these "thoughts" are "things" in their own right, and not representations. By exploiting the Augustinian tradition of the mirror to represent the soul containing ideas, or "thoughts," Traherne strategically advances his quest for non-metaphoric visual language. Consistent with DJescartes, Traherne argues that the soul's images are more real than physical images. Unlike early uses of the mirroring soul, however, Traherne's version of the reflective Christian soul must take into account the use of the glass mirror to verify thc accuracy of perspectival paintings. The mirror evolved f.rom a crude antiqLue steel instrument that reflected a shadowy, ill-defined figure, to the silver-backed glass with a reflection that seerms to duplicate objects. This technology renders the Pauline construction of the dark glass at best obsolete. The clarity of Traherne's mirroring soul reflects images sharply, not darkly, and thus these images are available to the faithf'ul Chnstian at the moTnent he looks into his soul.
Turn-ing what could be a heresy-a living Christian's seeing God-into an advantage, Traherne underscores the accuracy of the mirroring soul. Because of their clarity, reflections are, Traherne argues, more real than the physical things of the world. Yet crucial to Traherne's project, unlike material things, reflections have not beeni tainted by description or metaphoric comparison.
1'hus, Traherne emphasizes that reflectionis in the Christian soul are a metareality. By emphasizing the Cartesian notion that "ideas," or "thoughts" are more real than "things," Traherne creates lanother important place in which he can reform poetic language in describing these "things." H-le advances his metareality in his series of four "Thoughts" poems. 1 In the first of these poems, Traherne shows how he will use language non-metaphorically to give us "things" greater than those previously represented in language: ("Thoughts. 1." lines 1-12; 54-58)
Thoughts are "Machines," "Engines," "IFabricks," "Objects," all material and substantive entities, yet non-specific and abstract. No matter that the "images"
Carol Atin johiistonin the mirroring soul are "thoughts." Traherne continues to use the Cartesian understanding of "thoughts' as having material characteristics. Yet he makes a point neither to describe nor to compare "thoughts;" rather he asserts their existence and tells us how they function. With this important move, Trahemne extends the non-visual, visual language he develops from the language of perspective. The Christian trope of the nmirrolring soul gives Traheme a further means to give the "reall" and "naked truth" in language, without giving objects or images specific, subjective identity. Thoughts, coming from God, are available to all, and simply are-Traherne refuses to subjectify these images through metaphoric or specific comparison. Traheme's best-known poem, "Shadows in the Vater," shows his most comprehensive thinking about reflection and subjectivity. Without the context of the mirror as a touchstone of accuracy, "Shadows in the Water" can be read as yet another version of the Narcissus tale, though one with a happier ending. A young boy peers into a pool, confused by the reflection or "Shadows" that he sees there. "In unexperienc'd Infancy;" he believes that reflections in the pool show "Another World," beneath the pool. "Another World," "Another Sun," 'other WAorlds," "Another face," and so on; the repetition of "other" takes these various forms throughout the poem. The resolution of his "sweet mistake" occurs in stanza eight:
O ye that stand upon the Brink. Whom I so near me, throu the Chink, With NWonder see: What Faces there, Whose Feet, whose Bodies, do ye wear? I my companions see In You, another Me. They seemed Others, but are We; Our second Selvs those Shadows be.
(lines 5 7-64)
The boy seems to realize that figures in the reflection are not inhahitants of "A new Antipodes," but are one and the same with the self. I owever, he seems to nullify his recognition at the end of the poem, and this seeming reversal clarifies the emphatic realization that the reflections are not "other." The speaker recognizes these reflections in the water as Ileaven, and the beings there the better selves that he and his friends will meet/become in heaven:
... below the purling Stream som unknown Joys there be Laid up in Store for me: To which I shall, when that thin Skin Is broken, be admitted in.
(lines 76-80)
The problem that Traheme addresses here is the problemi. that the technically advanced mirror presenits to Paul's "Now through a glass darkly; then] face to face." Ilere, though looking in a pool, the speaker still sees clearly what is reflected there. Yet rather than the simple reflection of himself, which would show the speaker trapped in subjective vision, he sees rather a view of God's objective vision: he sees how his life vill look in heaven. The barrier of darkness or "shadow" that separates the "now" and the Christian hereafter siniply does not exist for this speaker; all that separates hinm fronm "then" is the surface of the pool, "that thin Skin."' raherne replaces the question of vision with one of meaning: yes, we can see clearly into the other world, the "then" of eternity, but what transpires there-the "joys"-rernain "unknowvn." The Christian can see vhat awaits his reuniion with Cod, but he cannot experience it. The fundamental aspect of that experience is suggested by the boy's view into the pool: the reflectuon seemis to suggest to the individual what "being seen" is like. Yet, this is tlhe supreme temptation offered by the mirror and its illusion of objectivity The individual's view otf hi-mself is hopelessly subjective; the right view is the objective view, and onie which only God with his truly perspectival and objective vision can obtain, "Slhadows in the Water" proposes a replacement for the TPauline now/thenl-dark/clear construction, offering a vision of then, now, but one that remiains subjective, as one's view of one's refiection is subjective. Traheme insists, however, that the Christian sees in his soul accurate irnages of his life in eternity: hl simply must not milstake the felicity of those visions with the end itself. 'he speaker in "The Odour." at the mid-point of the Poemns of Felicity, suggests an organic unity between self and world as atiother means of envisioning the self as Cod objectively sees hmlman beings:
Like amber fair thy l;ingers grow;
With fragrant I loney-sucks thy Head is crown'd; Like Stars, thine cys; thy Cheeks like Roses shew: All are Delights profound. 'talk with t'hy self, thy self enjoy and see: At once the Mirror and the object be.
(lirnes 55-60)
WhLle this passage is often discussed in terms of Lacanian mirror/object separation, withlin the context of Traherne's perspectival language, this construction serves as an important segue to the final move in his resolution to the problern of partial and subjective vision. A few lines before tlie above stanza, 'lraherne indicates the direction of the poetn: "But lie that cannot like an Angel see. / In lieven its self shall dv'ell in Misery" (lines 40-1). tJltimately, of course. his solution is metaphoric: in order to "see aight," we. must see ourselves as God and the angels view c reationi. Because he is doing his utmost to Carol AnnJohnston write non-or pre-metaphorically, Traherne invents this Arcimbaldo-like technique of transforming the self int) the world. Thus when one looks at the self, one sees both the human self, and the self as seen from heaven's perspective. This attempt at showing the limits of subjectivity without losing subjectivity does present a rather mind-boggling stretch of the visual imagination, yet this is the kind of mental stretching that Traherne expects of readers. Nothing naive or childlike here, but rather an attempt to solve the most vexing of cognitive problems: how do we perceive how we are perceived? IHow can a subject see objectively? Traherne adopts in his oeuvrc an elaborate theater combining seers, seeing, and reflections as he presents the penultimate move in his strategy to address this philosophical issue and "mend" the subjectivity of human perception. Trying to move beyond even the submerged metaphor of "seeing as seen" Traherne invents a scheme in which God is a 'seer" as well as an image, who can see his image in its various forms in the soul of the believer. "Thoughts" imprinted with God's image are reflected back to God, the prime viewer. "While being there [in the mirroring soull, they richly Beautifie/ The Place they fill, and yet communicatl Themselvs, reflecting to the Seers ey" ('The Circulation," lines 7-9). Though the poem aLso asserts that "Only tis GOD above,! That from, and in himself doth live" (lines 72-73), as we read in a subsequent poem, God the "Seer" is also God the reflector: "[God'si bosom is the Glass,/ Wherein we all things Everlasting See" ("The Anticipation," lines [24] [25] .3' like the human soul, God's soul is also a clear mirror. Each soul both reflects and comprehends the other's rnirroring soul. Seeing the self as a part of the world external to the self allows a contiguous relationship with the external. The mirror in our souls allows God to see himself in his creation. And the mirror of God allows us to see ourselves in him. Thus for Traherne's speaker, the creation is no longer "other," nor does the speaker need to rely solely upon the strategy of seeing his limbs as those of a tree. The universe lies within the speaker, just as he simultaneously resides within God and his creation.
The "Circulationi" in the title of the above lyric refers to the circulation of imagistic ideas between the mirroring souls of the Christian and God. The reflection of images between these reflecting souls elides into movement in subsequent poems. "The Vision," animates the mirroring soul: a "fountain"-a moving pool-becomes the "glass. "4 The fountain, not surprisingly, lies somewhere between a mirror and a stream; it both moves and reflects, always leading back to its own beginning, or "Caus":
To see the Fountain is a Blessed Thing; It is to see the King Of Glory face to face: But yet the End, The Glorious Wondrous End, is more; And yet the Fountain there we Comprehend, lThe Spring we there adore: For in the End the Fountain best is Shewn . As by Effects the (Caus is Known.
("The Vision,'; lines 41-48)
Traherne again addresses the potential heterodoxy that his hypothesis introduces: rather than seeinrg a dark and suggestive image In the mirroring solPaul's "through a glass, darkly'-the clear rmirror yields a clear image of the divine. Similar to the relationship between clear v'ision and the hereafter in "Shadows in the Water," his transfonnation of the mirroring souls of God and man into a flowing fountain addresses both the subjectivity of the mirror, and the problem of seeing God's being. Even with his complex and elaborate uses of non-visual visual language, of course, Traherne cannot solve the problem he sets for hIimiself. He must acknowledge that while Christians on earth have the ability "to see the King Of Glory face to face"; purely objective vision cannot exist: "But yet the End,! The Glorious WVondrous End, is more." Even if we follow the steps of his invention, we are only ensured that "we also comprelhend" that the "enid is mnore." The image in the soul, while it is clear and accurate, is within a larger range of concomitant images that we "comprehend," but cannot freeze or possess. Faith, alas, rermains the ineffable piece of the philosophical puzzle. The problems inherent in our thinking in temis of subjectivity and objectivity continue to plague philosophers today. Tfraherne prophetically engages this important issue, though his solutions may seem both anticque and untenable, and his cause, retrograde. Yet we marvel at the boldness of his enterprise: he attempts to undo 400 years of Petrarchan poetic practice, quite a risky undertakitng in itself, but to do so he goes further out on a limlb and employs the divisie technology of ltinear perspective. Combining the technology of the mnirror as the enabling device for the development of perspective with the Christian symbolism of the mirroring soul, Tlraherne clairns a metamorphosis of perspectival subjectivity into divine objecLtvity. This extraordinary amalgarnation of elements reveals that Trahernie himself embodies a rare alliance of attributes: conservative in his philosophical instincts, revolutionary in his use of poetic language and form, sagacious and forward thinlking in his choice of means to achieve his end. Salzburg. 1982) , i ranz NVohrer endeavors to correct these past "controversial" and "speculative" studies (17); he employs "an empirically substantLated psychology of mysticism"' (5). Wiohrer's attempt to shift the critical apparatus in 'Lraherne scholarship incorporates the material aspects of phenorrenological criticism. In doing so, he aspires to look at the way that 'iTaherne discusses his world, rather than the fact that he denies his world. Wvhrer's contbination of psychology and phenomenology at times takes away from a discussion of Traherne's language. Critics also lhave attempted to place 1'raheine's language vithin theological moven-sents such as (Cambridge Platonism, and to read hiin througi various critical lenses. Most recently in his 'troherne in Doldogui: Heidegge. Lacan, and Dernida (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Plress, 1988), A L.eigh DeNeef brings Iraherne "iEltti dialogue" wit th -leidegger, lacan, and Derrida "to try to reveal dhe thinking that validates and autdorizes his poetry" (20) . DeNeef argues that Traherne's "imnagination, continually returnintg to either a HLeideggerian lack or a tLacanian want, tuist obsessively attempt to fill sucli abysses wtth iDerridiatl 'niore"' (21 
